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On the Integration of Manufacturing Strategy: 
Deconstructing Hoshin Kanri 
 
Structured Abstract 
Purpose: To show that Hoshin Kanri has the potential to integrate the operations strategy 
literature into a coherent structure. Hoshin Kanri’s planning process is typically described as a 
top-down cascading of goals, starting with the senior management’s goals and moving to the 
lowest organizational level. We argue that this misrepresents a firm’s actual cognitive processes 
in practice because: (i) it implies reasoning from the effects to the cause; and (ii) it assumes a 
direct causal relationship between what the customer wants and what is realizable by the system. 
Design/methodology/approach: Conceptual; abductive, based on the literature. 
Findings: The actual strategic thought process executed in an organization consists of three 
iterative processes: (i) a translation process that derives the desired customer attributes from 
customer/stakeholder data; (ii) a process of causal inference that predicts realizable customer 
attributes from a possible system design; and, (iii) an integrative process of strategic choices 
whereby (i) and (ii) are aligned. Each element relies on different cognitive processes (logical 
relation, causal relation and choice). 
Research implications: By aligning the thought and planning processes, the competing concepts 
of manufacturing strategy are integrated into a coherent structure. 
Practical implications: Different techniques have to be applied for each of the three elements. 
Since each element relies on different cognitive processes (logical relation, causal relation and 
choice), the use of unifying tools (e.g. in the form of matrices, as often presented in the 
literature) is inappropriate. 
Originality/value: The first study to focus on the thought processes underpinning manufacturing 
strategy. 
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Hoshin Kanri is a multi-level, collective strategic implementation and planning methodology that 
has been viewed as a promising means of achieving both the horizontal and vertical coordination 
of operations strategy (Ishikawa, 1990; Akao, 1991). The first wave of implementations of 
Hoshin Kanri in the 1980s (e.g. at Toyota and Hewlett Packard) was followed by steady 
adoption by other global leaders (Ettlie, 1997; Lee & Dale, 1998; Witcher & Butterworth, 1999, 
2000; Witcher, 2003; Babich, 2005; Witcher et al., 2008). According to Witcher (2014), virtually 
all vehicle and car companies use Hoshin Kanri, partly due to the success of companies such as 
Toyota and Nissan and the use of the approach by their suppliers (Witcher & Butterworth 2001). 
Meanwhile, Hoshin Kanri has also been applied to other sectors, such as healthcare (e.g. Melum 
& Collett, 1995). Firms adopting Hoshin Kanri believe it is essential for lean operations (e.g., 
Dennis, 2007) and can help coordinate the complexities of a modern, global organization (e.g. 
Chen & Miller, 2010).  
Strategy formulation initiates operations strategy, and is the primary responsibility of senior 
management. After identifying the strategic goals, senior management initiates a Hoshin Kanri 
cycle. The Hoshin Kanri cycle is a repeating, periodic (typically on an annual basis) PDCA 
(Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle that is enhanced by Hoshin Kanri’s unique components; it aims to 
determine operational actions consistent with the achievement of the strategic goals (Witcher & 
Butterworth, 1997). The cycle starts with the Plan phase, which cascades senior management’s 
goals down to the lowest organizational level as a set of annual hoshins. These annual hoshins 
communicate a company’s strategic goals and, more importantly, the proposed means for 
achieving these goals. By simultaneously communicating the goals and the mechanisms for 
achieving them, Hoshin Kanri acts like a compass that guides a firm’s efforts. Specifically, the 
means at one level become the targets or goals for the next lower level. Through this cascading 
process, senior management’s goals are translated into operational targets. In the Do phase of 
PDCA, the Hoshin Kanri cycle ensures each level implements its plan through activities focused 
on realizing the goals identified in the Plan phase.  
Next, in the Check phase of PDCA, the Hoshin Kanri cycle consists of a set of planned 
periodic reviews that measure each level’s progress versus its hoshin targets. The Check phase 
provides management with the opportunity to identify any shortcomings in the plan. Here, the 
manager at each level measures actual goal accomplishment against target accomplishment and 
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engages in micro PDCA cycles to improve performance if the level has not reached the target 
performance. The level may engage in multiple PDCA cycles to resolve outstanding problems. 
As the year progresses, the higher level units use the department reports to measure their own 
progress versus their targets. They too can engage in mid-year PDCA activities to improve their 
performance versus their targets. As the year progresses further, the firm starts the Act phase of 
the Hoshin Kanri cycle, in which the firm will decide what worked effectively and what must be 
changed. The firm completes this Hoshin Kanri cycle in the Act phase by analyzing the data to 
determine what revisions to make to the hoshin for the next year (e.g. Babich, 2005; Jackson, 
2006). A new Hoshin Kanri cycle typically emerges and is subsequently initiated upon 
completion of the Act stage of the previous cycle. 
In one sense, all firms practice some form of Hoshin Kanri, since all firms communicate goals 
and seek to implement mechanisms/processes to achieve these goals, regardless of their level of 
formality. But many companies struggle with building effective links (da Silveira et al., 2017). 
Given the proliferation of elements of the Hoshin Kanri cycle, its thorough examination can 
inform firm-level strategy implementation. However, although Hoshin Kanri is well-regarded as 
an effective strategy implementation tool, we argue that its underlying cognitive processes and, 
consequently, the respective processes of firms that use less structured deployment processes, are 
not fully understood. We expect that clearly stating and explaining these thought processes will 
improve our ability to implement Hoshin Kanri.  
The current Hoshin Kanri literature considers the planning process to be ‘linear’ – i.e., senior 
management cascades its goals down to the lowest organization level. But this implies that 
managers reason from the effects (the desired output of the system) to the cause (a set of input 
variables for system manipulation), which, to the best of our knowledge, is not possible. The 
relationship between quality and zero defects, for example, presents a logical relationship that 
can be cascaded down; but the effect of changes in machine parameters on defect rates is a 
causal relationship. It is not possible to derive the machine parameters from the desired defect 
rate but rather our cognitive process proceeds iteratively, e.g. by estimating what would be the 
defect rate for a certain machine parameter. This confusion between a logical and causal 
relationship may also be at the heart of another prevailing short-coming in the operations strategy 
literature – that “the set of cause-and-effect factors which determine the linkage between strategy 
and production operations” (Skinner, 1969; p. 139) is elusive. We argue that these cause-and-
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effect factors do not in fact exist, as we cannot speak about causal processes when we refer to a 
(strategic) choice. Cooperate strategy seeks to determine what are the desired customer 
attributes. Manufacturing strategy is a pattern of structural and infrastructural decisions that 
determine the capability of a manufacturing system and specify how it will operate to realize a 
given set of attributes. While these realizable attributes should be consistent with the desired 
attributes (Platts et al., 1998), the system may not be able to realize all desired attributes since 
production operations are subject to causal constraints that determine what are the realizable 
attributes. To the best of our knowledge, there is no causal relationship between desired and 
realizable attributes, but this is a strategic choice. This may explain why management research 
and practice still struggles to establish the causal links that determine organizational performance 
(de Waal & Goedegebuure, 2017). 
Hence, the main contribution of this paper is to revise the description of Hoshin Kanri, 
resolving both misconceptions – (i) the confounding of logical and causal relationships; and (ii) 
the confounding of causal relationship and choice. It is expected that clarifying this distinction 
will facilitate Hoshin Kanri’s implementation and help to unlock the full potential of the 
approach as an integrative tool for operations strategy. By deconstructing Hoshin Kanri’s 
planning process, we reveal its structure and attempt to integrate the hoshin planning and 
operations strategy literature.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Hoshin Kanri before 
Section 3 outlines our methodology. Section 4 then deconstructs the Hoshin Kanri planning 
process. The relationship between Hoshin Kanri and operations strategy is discussed in Section 
5.  Finally, the paper concludes in Section 6. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
This section discusses the Hoshin Kanri literature to illustrate the deployment process and 
provide the ground for our argumentation. It is not a comprehensive literature review, but rather 
literature is used to support our task. For a comprehensive literature review the reader is referred 
to e.g. Jolayemi (2008).  
Hoshin Kanri is a multi-level strategic planning methodology based on collective planning 
and implementation principles. Its objective is to link senior management’s goals to operational 
targets that allow for the realization of these goals. Hoshin Kanri co-evolved with Total Quality 
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Management (TQM) in Japanese firms, starting in the 1950s, as executives sought to enhance 
their quality improvement efforts (Witcher & Butterworth, 1999; Babich, 2005; Nicholas, 2014). 
To improve the definition of their quality goals, Japanese firms first integrated the Deming Cycle 
(i.e. Plan-Do-Check-Act: PDCA) into their enterprise-wide planning systems (Ishikawa, 1990). 
They then adopted Drucker’s (1954) Management by Objectives (MbO) to instill goal clarity 
into their quality systems. For example, the Deming Prize incorporated many Hoshin Kanri 
concepts into its checklist in 1958 (Wood & Munshi, 1991; Jackson, 2006) and accelerated its 
diffusion in Japan as firms sought to imitate the prize winners (Babich, 2005). However, while 
the origins of Hoshin Kanri in Japan owe much to MbO, in Western organizations MbO has 
often been used to simply cascade down management objectives and to control the performance 
of subordinates, rather than to manage the objectives themselves. Similarly, the balanced 
scorecard – another related policy deployment technique introduced by Kaplan & Norton (1992) 
– is strong in defining what should be done, but it has little to say about how this should be done 
(Witcher 2014). In contrast, Hoshin Kanri emphasizes unique techniques such as ‘catchball’, 
which refers to feedback cycles between the different levels of an organization on what should 
be achieved, what can be achieved and, most importantly, how it can be achieved (da Silveira et 
al., 2018).  
A common portrayal of the overall Hoshin Kanri process is shown below in Figure 1 – in this 
study, we focus on Hoshin Kanri’s planning process, which will be discussed next. 
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
2.1 Hoshin Kanri: The Planning Process 
The literature models Hoshin Kanri planning as a hierarchical process that links the different 
parts of the organization through the process of issuing hoshins, which then cascade vertically 
through the organization. The Hoshin Kanri process uses teams to coordinate the plans as they 
are developed throughout the organization. For example, Jackson (2006) divides the organization 
into hoshin teams, tactical teams, operational teams and action teams. To create high quality 
decisions and avoid decision bias these teams should be heterogeneous (Cristofaro, 2017) with 
appropriate conflict resolving mechanism in place (Parayitam & Papenhausen, 2018). 
Since the cascading process allows each team to work independently, a question of 
governance arises – how is it best to co-ordinate targets (and thus activities) across these 
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disparate teams? The literature has proposed that consensus and thus alignment across levels is 
achieved through a so-called catchball process (e.g. Jackson, 2006). The term catchball refers to 
an iterative process in which information and ideas are “thrown” and “caught” vertically and 
horizontally throughout the organization. Catchball consists of discussion and feedback about 
goals and the means to achieve these goals. During this consensus building process, the goals 
and resource allocations can be affected (Cowley & Domb, 1997; Tennant & Roberts, 2001). It is 
meant to close the “knowing-doing” gap described by Pfeffer & Sutton (2000) and, when 
properly aligned, may lead to “double-loop” learning (Argyris, 1982). The catchball process 
actually begins with a carefully written hoshin; it represents the operationalization of the 
strategy. The hoshin is a clear statement of the goals and the means to achieve these goals, and it 
serves as a constraint on the levels below.  The cascading down of objectives is done by passing 
on the hoshin.   
As illustrated in Figure 2, the catchball process includes the initial cascade down of the 
objectives. This is followed by a roll-up of the plans to consolidate local plans and check for the 
capability and likelihood of their execution (Bechtell, 1996; Jackson, 2006). As each vertical 
level receives its hoshin, it translates it for the level below by taking the means given to them and 
making these means the goal for the next level.  
 
[Take in Figure 2] 
 
There are three important components of the hoshin (Shiba & Walden, 2001). One is the 
goal/target, the second is the means by which this goal is to be accomplished, and the third is the 
metric by which the accomplishment is to be measured. An individual hoshin may not be unique, 
but the formalization of these three core elements together makes it unique.  
There exists broad evidence on the beneficial effect of strategic alignment. Hoshin Kanri 
achieves strategic alignment by linking the means and goals of each level of the company 
through the deployment process described above. However, while Hoshin Kanri’s planning 
process appears to be well understood in the literature, we argue that it overlooks an important 
distinction in the type of relationship between the goals and means (at each level and in-between 
levels). This relationship may be either a logical relationship, such as between being cheap and 
costing less than $100, or a causal relationship, such as between changing a machine parameter 
and obtaining a certain throughput rate. Moreover, means at a higher level, which become goals 
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for a lower level, may not be realizable – hence, choices have to be made.  We therefore look 
beyond the documented components of Hoshin Kanri’s planning process. Our vehicle is a 
deconstruction of its thinking process based on abductive reasoning. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our study develops an argument based on reasoning. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
methodological account of scientific reasoning, whether it be deductive, inductive or abductive. 
We closely follow the definition in Peirce (1998), so our reasoning is mainly abductive. 
Abductive reasoning draws an inference to a possible explanation. It is followed by deductive 
reasoning to determine testable consequences and inductive reasoning to empirically test these 
consequences; the latter is considered to be outside the scope of this study. Abductive reasoning 
does not rule out alternative explanations, rather the normative ideal is the selection of the ‘best 
explanation'. The criterion for assessing our reasoning is therefore its coherence within a system 
of statements.  
The best way of achieving this coherence is via the use of formal language, but management 
theory is often only expressible in natural language. Mantere & Ketokivi (2013) go so far as to 
claim that no theory about organizations is logically coherent in a normative sense. Management 
theory is therefore often based on implicit reasoning, which simply goes from the likeness of one 
case to another without explaining in what sense the likeness exists. In contrast, explicit 
reasoning occurs when the mind recognizes the relationship between two experiences and 
explains the nature of the relationship (Aram & Salipante, 2003). Since our argument is based on 
implicit reasoning, we must illuminate the underlying logic instead of relying on formal language 
(Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
Any evaluation of our argument then centers on the transparency of the deductive chain of 
evidence – the creditability and plausibility of the theoretical ‘story’ presented. It is this narrative 
paradigm and its associated narrative rationality (Fisher, 1987) that builds the methodological 
background to our study.  
 
4. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 The Plan Phase of Hoshin Kanri: Deconstruction of its Thinking Process 
Consider the following statements: 
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Statement 1:  The customer/management wants a high quality product. 
Statement 2: The customer/management wants a product with a certain value of a measureable 
quality characteristic A. 
Statement 3: The system produces a product with a certain value of a measureable quality 
characteristic A. 
Statement 4: The system variable X should be set to a certain target value so the desired value 
of measureable quality characteristic A can be realized.   
 
The objective of Hoshin Kanri’s planning process is the determination of Statement 4 from 
Statement 1. The literature argues that this is achieved by ‘cascading down’, i.e. from Statement 
1 → Statement 2 → Statement 3 → Statement 4. Here, it is argued that this necessarily implies 
reasoning from effects (Statement 3) to the cause (Statement 4). While the link between 
Statement 1 and Statement 2 is a logical and thus symmetrical relationship (i.e. ‘a high quality 
product is a product with a certain value of a measureable quality characteristic A’ and ‘a 
product with a certain value of a measureable quality characteristic A is of high quality’ are 
equivalent statements), the link between Statement 3 and Statement 4 is a causal relationship – 
and thus asymmetrical (i.e. ‘the process variable X at a certain target value causes a certain value 
of measureable quality characteristic A’ cannot be transposed into the statement ‘a certain value 
of measureable quality characteristic A causes the process variable X to be at a certain value’). It 
is, to the best of our knowledge, impossible to reason from Statement 3 (the goal) to Statement 4 
(the means). Rather, an iterative process of reasoning from Statement 4 to Statement 3, 
evaluating different settings for Statement 4, is applied. Our claim is supported by the vast 
literature on the design of experiments – which uses experiments (i.e. different settings of the 
possible cause) to determine the effect. This literature would be meaningless if reasoning from 
the effect to the cause were possible. Therefore, we argue for two very different deployment 
processes before the outcomes of the processes are aligned through a set of strategic choices, i.e. 
Statement 1 → Statement 2 – choice – Statement 3 ← Statement 4. 
From the above, it follows that the Hoshin Kanri planning process that is actually executed 
must consist of two deployment processes. The first is a process of translation and clarification 
(Statement 1 → Statement 2). The second is a process of causal inference, which uses causal 
relationships between ‘real’ variables to allow for system manipulation (Statement 4 → 
Statement 3). Both are aligned by strategic choices (i.e. the decision of the organization 
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concerning which of the attributes from the set of attributes desired by the customer to realize) at 
a so-called Clash with Reality frontier. 
The Clash with Reality frontier highlights the second misconception of Hoshin Kanri’s 
planning process as being a linear process. In practice, there is an apparent disconnect between 
what the customer/manager wants and what is physically possible. There is no restriction on the 
former but the latter is constrained by current operational capabilities and available resources 
during the Do phase. This disconnect cannot be bridged by any relationship (whether causal or 
logical), but rather it is a question of strategic choice. In our example above, quality 
characteristic A may not be realizable by the shop or only realizable by investing heavily in new 
equipment – so a choice has to be made regarding what degree of quality characteristic A can 
(and should) be realized. This choice is only bound by available resources; there is no 
relationship between Statement 2 and Statement 3. While this Clash with Reality is implicitly 
recognized in the practitioner literature about Hoshin Kanri, scholarly treatment of this 
assumption requires explicit refinement. For example, Rochetti (2016) states that after top 
management has approved the plan, it needs to be validated by middle management, which is 
responsible for asking: “What could get in the way of making this a reality?” (Rochetti, 2016; p. 
27). 
 
4.2 A Framework of Hoshin Kanri’s Planning Process 
Figure 3 illustrates our understanding of the different parts involved in Hoshin Kanri’s planning 
process. All are required to determine appropriate values [?̂?1, ?̂?2, … ?̂?𝑘] for a set of Do variables, 
i.e. variables on which to intervene after the Plan phase and during the Do phase. In what now 
follows, we use upper case letters to denote a set of variables and lower case letters for specific 
variables.  
 
[Take in Figure 3] 
 
The different parts of the process can be summarized as follows: 
 Translation: This process converts texts into a set of desired customer attributes (such as 
quality characteristics, speed of delivery, price, etc.) – [𝑎1
∗ , 𝑎2
∗ , … 𝑎𝑛
∗ ] – which are measureable, 
and thus, specific. The objective is to distill what is meant by the customer/management 
interpreting the texts. Texts refer to printed matter, recorded speech, visual communication, 
works of art, artefacts, etc. These texts are produced by the customer(s), management or 
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other stake/shareholders to which the process shall be aligned. The main techniques for 
interpreting the texts come from social sciences, e.g. in the form of content analysis.  
 Clash with Reality: This is the frontier between the translational and causal deployment 
processes. Here, the set of desired customer attributes and the set of realizable customer 
attributes – [𝑎1, 𝑎2, … 𝑎𝑛] – have to be aligned. This is achieved through strategic choices 
(Scott, 2003). It is here, and only here, that the ‘cause-and-effect’ factors that link strategy 
and operations (Skinner, 1969) are found. But it is apparent that it is not a causal link but 
rather a strategic decision or choice bounded by the organization’s internal and external 
resources. 
 Product/Service Design: All realizable customer attributes are determined by the system 
design, i.e. the variables and the variable-linking structure. But a part of these variables is 
mediated – and thus can be influenced – by the product/service design. For example, the 
same function of a product may be realized by a design that requires a large set of complex 
system operations or a small set of simple system operations. The main techniques are based 
on causal inference. 
 System Design: This process determines a set of Do variables [?̂?1, ?̂?2, … ?̂?𝑘] through which a 
specific set of system variables [𝑦1, 𝑦2, … 𝑦𝑚] can be realized. The set of system variables 
describes the product/service system. It is comprised of a set of Do variables and a set of 
state variables [𝑧1, 𝑧2, … 𝑧𝑗]. State variables, e.g. throughput times, lead times and quality 
standards, are all system variables that cannot be realized through direct intervention. Rather, 
they are the output of the system. These variables play the most important role during the 
Check phase as Do variables are expected to be at a certain target value. The main techniques 
for system design are based on causal inference. 
 
Our description above suggests that the Hoshin Kanri deployment process is not a linear 
process of cascading down. Rather, the translation of a set of desired customer attributes from 
texts, and the inference of realizable customer attributes from a set of Do variables, has to be 
executed simultaneously with the alignment process that occurs at the Clash with Reality frontier 
(through strategic choices). In other words, it is not possible to just change the value of a 
realizable attribute – this change has to be based on a Do variable and an inferential process to 
predict the effect of this change on the realizable attribute. In the absence of these steps being 
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synchronized, a firm is left to search “in the dark” for alignment, relying on poorly understood 
micro-level social activities (e.g. Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009), as it lurches towards some 
form of ‘fit’ (cf. Siggelkow, 2002). 
 
5. THE INTEGRATION OF OPERATIONS STRATEGY 
Operations strategy is an important component of a firm’s overall strategy; it is critical to its 
operational success, and thus has been a core focus of management research for many decades 
(e.g. Skinner, 1969, 1996; Leong et al., 1990; Roth & Miller, 1992; Miller & Roth, 1994; Hayes 
& Pisano, 1996;). Yet the literature on operations strategy appears to be fragmented. For 
example, Skinner (1969), and later Voss (1995, 2005), identified three main aspects of 
operations strategy: (i) competing through manufacturing, which means that manufacturing 
provides the firm with a particular competitive advantage, which in turn determines the particular 
strategic demands on the manufacturing function (or similarly on a service process); (ii) strategic 
choices, such as determining which demands should be fulfilled; and (iii) the identification of 
best practices, which are then used to design the manufacturing function to fulfill the demands 
chosen in part (ii). The authors did not however fully explain why these three aspects should 
emerge, which hinders a full understanding of their relationship. Hoshin Kanri is a useful 
framework for explaining the emergence of these three aspects of operations strategy; 
specifically, Hoshin Kanri’s deconstruction suggests that these three aspects emerge because 
each relates to a different way of thinking (interpretation, choice, and causal reasoning), which 
explains why they are so ‘remarkably robust’ (Voss, 2005; p. 1223): 
(i) Competing through manufacturing: Competing through manufacturing requires a firm to 
identify the order-qualifying and order-winning criteria (i.e. the firm’s competitive 
priorities).  The firm uses these criteria to secure an initial market position and to sustain this 
competitive position in the market over time (Hill, 1993). In other words, this aspect of 
operations strategy is concerned with identifying what the customer wants and tracking 
changes in customer preferences over time. This is a process of interpretation or translation – 
not a process of choice or causal reasoning. To be successful at this, firms must first unravel 
the meaning of the qualitative data or descriptive texts and images that they receive from 
their current and potential customers. This requires firms to have the ability to translate this 
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often non-quantitative and possibly conflicting data into a set of desired customer attributes 
(i.e. a set of measureable variables).  
(ii) Strategic choices – Alignment: Strategic choice is essentially about aligning desired and 
realizable customer attributes. It is literally a question of choice – since there is not a logical 
or causal relationship between what the customer wants and what the firm can provide. This 
recognition of the nature of strategic choices is the essential subject of the trade-off and 
cumulative models of operations strategy that have been extensively examined in the 
operations literature (e.g. Nobel, 1997; Schmenner & Swink, 2004; Rosenzweig & Easton, 
2010; Sarmiento et al., 2013, 2016). For example, the trade-off model claims that the 
decision of a firm to focus on one set of customer attributes means that the firm must 
necessarily choose not to provide some other set of customer attributes. 
(iii) Best practices – Causal inference: The concept that firms can adopt best manufacturing 
practices is contingent upon the ability of firms to identify and then adapt these practices to 
their existing operating system (e.g. Sousa & Voss, 2008). Specifically, this means that firms 
must be able to search for and identify superior performance results and then, once observed, 
firms must be able to analyze these results in order to derive the underlying operations 
practices. Restated, firms have to identify the underlying cause-and-effect relationships. This 
reasoning always has to start with possible causes that may explain superior performance 
results, many of which rely upon micro-foundations that are unobservable or ambiguous in 
nature. To open this “black box”, firms need to evaluate through experimentation. To be 
successful, the firm needs to identify the cause-and-effect relationships underlying best 
practices and determine how to integrate them into their existing operations in order to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. As Abrahamson & Fairchild (1999) 
demonstrated, this is not a simple task and it is made more complicated by the large amount 
of rhetoric in the discourse about management techniques. Approaches to doing this have 
been the subject of the organizational learning literature that is interested in understanding 
how organizations learn about best practices, interpret these practices and help to 
institutionalize them. This process requires both feed-back learning and feed-forward 
learning to be successful. In this process, firms identify their key processes and examine how 
to integrate the “new” best practices into their key processes, and then how to diffuse these 
best practices throughout the firm. Best practices can be diffused (and thus replicated) since 
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they are based on at least partially invariant cause-and-effect relationships. Within the 
Hoshin Kanri planning process, best practices affect the relationship between Do variables 
and realizable customer attributes, yielding actionable tactical and operational plans through 
multiple feedback loops. 
 
Hoshin Kanri provides an organizing framework to integrate the operations strategy 
literature. In doing so, it extends the commonly applied distinction between the content and 
process of operations strategy (Leong et al., 1991; Hayes et al., 2008; Slack & Lewis, 2008). 
Content and process variables are a subdivision within each of the three aspects of the operation 
strategy literature – competing through manufacturing, strategic choices and best practices. But 
the relationships between content and process variables are different for each, since a different 
thinking process needs to be applied. Both – content and process variables – are represented in 
Figure 3. For example, the variable (A, P, X, Y and Z) are the content variables. Meanwhile, the 
process variables are represented by the arrows – these are the methods that Hoshin Kanri uses to 
iterate between its current state (Z) to both its system design (Y) and its product design (P) to 
identify the necessary system inputs (X) to move the state in the correct direction to result in the 
realizable customer attributes (A). 
Hoshin Kanri’s organizing framework clarifies the inter-relationships between the different 
parts of operations strategy presented in the literature. For example, Voss (1995) sees the three 
aspects of operations strategy as creating a continuous cycle, as depicted in Figure 4a, in which a 
firm that is “competing through manufacturing” makes “strategic choices” that lead to new “best 
practices”, which then affects its ability to compete. The interpretation of the Hoshin Kanri 
framework provided above suggests that the cycle in Figure 4a does not fully represent the 
process of planning in manufacturing strategy. This framework suggests that the alternative 
planning process illustrated in Figure 4b is more representative. Competing through 
manufacturing and best practices are not directly connected but have to be aligned through 
strategic choices. Meanwhile, although management chooses the best practice to be applied as 
part of strategic choices, it is the best practice that causes this choice. The best practice 
determines the realizable attributes and thus constrains the strategic choice. If the choice is to 
realize 100 pieces per hour (desired attribute) then this does not determine the best practice to 
realize 100 pieces per hour (and whether this is possible at all). Rather, the potential effect of 
different best practices has to be taken into account when making this choice. This potential 
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effect cannot be determined starting from the performance results of a best practice due to the 
nature of the underlying invariant cause-and-effect relationships. Thus, realizable attributes, 
determined by best practices, and desired attributes, determined by competing through 
manufacturing, have to be aligned in an iterative process of strategic choice. This iterative 
process is illustrated by an additional arrow in Figure 4b, which relates to feedback on the 
possible effect of different best practices potentially derived from experiments. 
 
[Take in Figure 4] 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Translating corporate strategy into operations strategy has been a key focus of Operations 
Management for many decades. Yet the field still awaits a comprehensive framework that 
integrates the literature concerned with implementing operations strategy. We argue that Hoshin 
Kanri holds the key to this integration; however, there is a major disconnect between how 
Hoshin Kanri’s planning process is executed in practice and how it is modeled in the literature. 
The literature argues for a ‘linear’ planning process that cascades senior management’s goals 
down to the lowest organization level. We argue that this misrepresents a firm’s actual cognitive 
processes in practice because: (i) it implies reasoning from the effects to the cause; and (ii) it 
assumes a direct causal relationship between what the customer wants and what is realizable by 
the firm’s operating system.  
This paper has deconstructed Hoshin Kanri’s planning process to explain how it can provide 
an integrating framework for operations strategy implementation. Our analysis demonstrates that 
there are two distinct deployment processes that have to be executed simultaneously to achieve 
alignment through a set of strategic choices. This divides Hoshin Kanri’s planning process into 
three distinct parts: a translation process, a process of alignment (or choices), and a process of 
causal inference to predict the effect of system manipulation, as illustrated in Figure 3. The 
understanding of the Hoshin Kanri process based on this deconstruction helps to integrate the 
operations strategy literature in two ways. First, it provides an explanation of why literature on 
operation strategy can recurrently be subdivided into three different streams – competing though 
manufacturing, strategic choices and best practices. Our analysis argues that each separated 
stream of research emerges because each relates to a different way of thinking (interpretation, 
choice, and causal reasoning). Second, it provides a first step in integrating the three streams of 
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literature into a holistic whole by providing a framework that relates the different thought 
processes to each other.  
 
6.1 Managerial Implications 
Our study has revealed that comprehensive strategic planning – such as in the form of Hoshin 
Kanri – entails several differing thought processes (logical relation, causal relation and choice). 
Different techniques have to be applied for each of these thought processes. The use of unifying 
tools (e.g. in the form of matrices, as often presented in the literature) is inappropriate if, for 
example, causal and logical relations are used in the same matrix. Rather, separate tools need to 
be applied for interpreting logical relationships (e.g. from content analysis), making choices (e.g. 
from game theory) and discovering the causal relationships that may result in best practices (e.g. 
by use of directed acyclic graphs). 
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This study is based on abductive reasoning that draws an inference from initial observation to a 
possible explanation. It should be followed by deductive reasoning to determine testable 
consequences and inductive reasoning to empirically test these consequences. Both are 
considered outside the scope of this study, which is a major limitation. While the limitation is 
justified by the need to keep the study focused and provide room for our argumentation, future 
empirical research is required. Meanwhile, and as highlighted above, separate tools initially need 
to be developed for interpreting logical relationships, making choices and discovering the causal 
relationships that may result in best practices. But later, these tools need to be integrated. The 
goal of this research stream is promising, but our paper represents only the first step towards a 
comprehensive, theory-driven framework. Finally, future research should also build on our 
contribution at the Plan phase by exploring how to realize the targets set in the Do phase, how to 
ensure the targets are achieved in the Check phase, and how to standardize success in the Act 
phase. This will unlock the full integrative potential of Hoshin Kanri as a strategic 
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Figure 2:  The Hoshin Planning (Deployment) Process, as Presented in the Literature (e.g. 





































Figure 3: Analysis of Hoshin Kanri’s Planning Process  
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Figure 4: The Interplay between Competing Through Manufacturing, Best Practices and 
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